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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15566

-vsKENNETH M. FORSHEE, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft
by deception, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann.
76-6-405(1)

§

(Supp. 1977), in the Third District Court,

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H.
Croft, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried without a jury on
November 2, 1977.

Judge Croft found the appellant guilty

of theft by deception under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405
(Supp. 1977), and sentenced him to an indeterminate term
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.

The
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execution of the sentence was stayed, and the defendant was
placed on two years probation and fined $1,000.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the conviction
below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
l'lr.

and l'lrs. James Smith, the complainants, purchasecl

a used car from the appellant, Kenneth Forshee, Jr., on or
about November 5, 1976 (T.ll).

They first looked at the car

on November 3, 1976, on the appellant's used car lot (T.7),
and on that occasion, the appellant indicated that the car
had been recently repainted and that the mileage on the
odometer, approximately 33,800 miles, was correct (T.9).
The complainants were looking specifically for a 1973 Monte
Carlo (T.31), that would be dependable enough to allow Mr.
Smith to leave the state to find work (T.9).

The Smiths

returned to the lot on the next day (T.lO), and made a
down payment on the car.

The defendant again represented

the mileage on the car to be accurate (T.lO).

On November

9, 1976, the Smiths paid the balance due on the car to Mr.
Forshee (T.l3).

The total sales price was $2,830 plus taxes.

On March 21, 1977, while cleaning out the Monte
Carlo,

Mr. Smith discovered a lubrication sticker on the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
-2-

door frame that had been covered up when the car had been
repainted (T.l3).

The lubrication sticker indicated

mileage in excess of 80,000 miles (T.l4).

After making

several phone calls to various governmental agencies,
Mr. Smith spoke to John McKnight of the Utah Division of
Motor Vehicles (T.lS).

Mr. McKnight examined the car at

the State Fairgrounds that same day (T.l6).
On March 22, 1977, the appellant called the
Smiths at home and asked them to come into his office to
discuss the car (T.l6).

The appellant made several offers

to appease the Smiths in an effort to enlist their help in
getting the State "off his back"

(T.l7,18,20).

Evidence was offered to show that the defendant
purchased the car from the Salt Lake Auto Auction for
$1850 (T.93), and at that time the car had approximately
73,000 miles on it (T.92).
Mr. Smith testified that although his wife liked
the car at the time they discovered the odometer had been
tampered with (T.30), that he would not have purchased the
vehicle had he known that the 33,800 miles indicated on the
odometer was inaccurate (T.20).

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH ODOMETER STATUTES, UTAH CODE ANN.
41-6-176, ET SEQ.

§§

(SUPP. 1977), AND THE THEFT

BY DECEPTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-6-405 (SUPP.

1977), ARE NOT DUPLICATIVE, AND THE APPELLANT WAS
PROPERLY CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 76-6-405.
On page 3 of his brief, the appellant asserts
that "it is a general rule of statutory construction
that where two statutes treat the same subject matter,
the one general and the other specific in its provisions,
the specific provision controls."
While this is undoubtedly the rule in Utah, the
appellant has assumed the fact that two statutes, Utah
Code Ann.

§

76-6-405 (Supp. 1977), and Utah Code Ann.

41-6-176, et seq.

(Supp. 1977), are duplicative.

§§

This

assumption is incorrect.
Section 76-6-405(1), provides that "A person
commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over
property of another by deception and with a purpose to
deprive him thereof."
Section 41-6-177, provides:
"It shall be unlawful to do
any of the following acts with
respect to the operation of an
odometer in any motor vehicle:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(l)
For any person to
disconnect, turn back, or reset
the odometer of any motor
vehicle with the intent to
reduce the true number of miles
indicated upon the odometer gauge.
(2)
For any person, with
intent to defraud, to operate a
motor vehicle on any street or
highway knowing that the odometer
of the vehicle is disconnected or
nonfunctional.
(3)
For any person to advertise
for sale, to sell, to use, or to
install on any part of a motor vehicle
or on an odometer in a motor vehicle
any device which causes the odometer
to register any mileage othAr than
the true mileage driven. For the
purposes of this act the true mileage
driven is the mileage driven by the
car as registered by the odometer within
the manufacturer's designed tolerance."
(Emphasis added.)
In short, the appellant contends that since he
could have been charged under Section 41-6-177(1), which is
a misdemeanor, he cannot be convicted for the subsequent
act of selling the automobile under Section 76-6-405(1),
which constitutes a felony.
The statutes on their face clearly are not
duplicative.

They deal with different subject matter and

contain different elements of criminality.

The odometer

statute proscribes only the disconnecting, turning back,
or resetting of an odometer, or the operation of a vehicle
knowing the odometer to be inoperative with an intent to
defraud.

No mention is made of the subsequent sale of the
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auto in the statute, and the violation is complete as
soon as the tampering has occurred.

On the other

hand, Section 76-6-405, addresses itself to the situation
that arises when a subsequent sale of the vehicle is
made.

In fact, it goes beyond the odometer statutes and

requires additional elements of proof to sustain a
conviction.

While it is true that the appellant could

have been charged with a violation of both offenses
contained in two statutes, the statutes are not
duplicative.

People v. Ross, 25 Cal.App.3d 190, 100

Cal.Rptr. 703 (1972).
In State v. Harlan, 116 N.H. 598, 364 A.2d 1254
(1976), the court addressed the identical issue on the
same facts presented in this case.

The defendants in

Harlan, supra, were found guilty of both theft by deception and tampering with an odometer.

The court concluded:

"An examination of the statutes
reveals that the elements of each
crime differ materially despite the
fact that the operative facts on
which the State relies in the present
indictments may also constitute an
offense under R.S.A. 260 · 91, :92
[the tampering statute).i The critical
1

"260:91 Misrepresentation and Certification of Mileage. M
person who changes, tampers with or defaces, or who attempt
to change, tamper with or deface, any gauge, dial, or other
mechanical instrument, commonly known as an odometer or an
hour meter in a motor vehicle, highway building appliance,
(continued on next page)
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difference lies in the fact that
R.S.A. 637:42 [theft by deception]
requires a finding that the defendant
unlawfully converted the property of
another to his own use, an element
wholly lacking under R.S.A. 260:91.
The statutes are neither inconsistent
nor duplications in that regard.
Tampering with an odometer with the
intent to deceive a prospective purchaser may well be preparatory to the
commission of the more serious offense
of theft by deception. It does not
follow that the State is precluded from
charging the greater simply because it
might have charged the lesser • • • The
offenses are not the same in law and in
fact and thus these indictments do not
raise the specter of abuse of prosecutorial discretion." 364 A.2d at 1258.

1

(continued)
snowmobile or boat, which, under normal circumstances and without being changed, tampered with or defaced,
is designed to show by numbers or words the distance which the
motor vehicle, highway building appliance, snowmobile or boat
has traveled or the use sustained with the intention of misrepresenting to a prospective or eventual purchaser the number
of miles traveled or the use sustained by said motor vehicle,
highway building appliance, snowmobile or boat, shall be
punished pursuant to the provisions of RSA 260:92. Actual
mileage will be certified by the previous owner to the best
of his knowledge at the time of sale, trade or other type of
transaction resulting in an assignment of title of the vehicle
by an entry on the certificate of title or the application for
a title if a certificate of title is required, or if no certificate of title is required by a notarized statement by the seller.
"260:92 Penalty. Any person who violates the provisions
of RSA 260:91 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor for the first
offense, and for a subsequent offense, guilty of a class B felon~
if a natural person, or guilty of a felony if any other person."
New Hampshire Revised Stat. Annotated, 1955, as amended.

2

"637:4 Theft by Deception. 1. A person commits theft if he
obtains or exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." New
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, 1955, as amended"
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The New Hampshire court continued, saying that "Since
the one statute does not mirror the other, the State
is free to proceed under either or both, cognizant of
its greater burden under R.S.A. 637:4."
A similar result was reached in State v.
Waldenburg, 9 Wash.App. 529, 513 P.2d 577

(1973),

in which the court noted the different elements in the
larceny statute, under which the defendant was convicted,
and the tampering statute.
In his brief, at page 5, appellant asserts
that since the legislature has decreed the act of
tampering with the odometer to be a misdemeanor in
legislation enacted subsequent to Section 76-6-405, it has
considered and rejected the idea that a violator of
Section 41-6-176, et seq., can be prosecuted under Section
76-6-405.

Once again, the appellant overlooks the doctrine

that if a statute can be determined from the plain meaning
of the words used, the courts may not go further and apply
any other means of interpretation. Montana Assn. of Tobacco
and Candy Distr. v. State Board of Equalization, 476 P.2d
775 (Mont. 1970).

See also, Comment, Prosecutorial Dis-

cretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 Univ.
Colordao Law Review, 455, 1971.
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Even if the intent expressed by the legislature
in enacting the odometer statutes is considered, it
indicates no more than a desire to proscribe that which
is unambiguously stated, and does not discuss the act of
selling the vehicle after the violation occurs.

In People

v. Ross, supra, the court addressed an issue very similar
to the one in this case, and concluded that the mere
enactment of the odometer statute did not manifest the
legislature's intent that the odometer statute would
preclude prosecutions for theft by false pretenses.
Cal.R. at 705.

100

See 76 A.L.R.3d 999.

State v. Kliewer, 210 Kan. 820, 504 P.2d 580
(1972), relied on by the appellant (page 5 of appellant's
brief) is distinguishable in that the two statutes
addressed themselves to virtually the same subject matter. 3

3

"21-4403. Deceptive commercial practices.
(1) A
deceptive commercial practice is the act, use or
employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, or knowing misrepresentation of
a material fact, with the intent that others shall rely
thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise,
whether or not any person has in fact been misled,
deceived, or damaged thereby.
(2) • • . (c) 'Sale' means
any sale, offer for sale, or attempt to sell any
merchandise for any consideration • . • (4) A deceptive
commercial practice is a class B misdemeanor.
[L. 1969,
ch. 180, § 21-4403; July 1, 1970.)"
"8-611. Odometers, tachometers and other devices
registering mileage; unlawful acts; penalties.
(a) It
shall be unlawful for any person to sell or convey a
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library.page)
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The more general statute, under which Kliewer was
convicted, dealt with deceptive representations in the
sale of merchandise, and the Kansas court found that
statute and the odometer statute to be in conflict.

3

(continued) motor vehicle knowing that the odometer,
tachometer or any other device used for registering
the mileage or use of such motor vehicle has been
disconnected, turned back, reset, replaced or made
inonerative with the intent and for the purpose of
defrauJing a purchaser.
(b)
It shall be unlawful for any person to
disconnect, turn back, reset or replace the odometer,
tachometer or any other device used for registering the
mileage or use of motor vehicles with the intent to
reduce the number of miles or use thereof indicated on
such gauge or device. The provisions of this section
shall not apply to any of the following:
(l) The disconnecting of the odometer, tachometer or any other device used for registering the
mileage or use of new motor vehicles being tested by the
manufacturer prior to the delivery to a dealer.
(2)
Replacement of a damaged or broken odometer,
tachometer or other device used for registering the
mileage or use of a motor vehicle with a new one when
such new gauge or device registers
'O' miles or use.
(c) The term 'motor vehicle' as used in this
section shall mean every vehicle which is self-propelled
except aircraft.
(d) The term 'person' as used in this section
shall mean an individual, partnership, corporation or
association.
(e) Any person violating the provisions of this
act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by confinerne~
in the county jail for a period not to exceed six (6)
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
[L.
1969, ch. 50, § l, July 1.]" Kansas Statutes Annotated.
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In summary, Utah Code Ann.
seq., and

§

§§

41-6-176, et.

76-6-405, are not duplicative.

Section

76-6-405 requires the State to prove the additional
element that the accused obtained control over the
property of another with the intent to deprive him
thereof.

Because they are not duplicative, the

appellant's argument that since the odometer statute
is more specific, it should apply, is inapplicable
since that rule of statutory construction is not to be
applied unless the statutes are duplicative or not
distinguishable based upon their plain meaning.
POINT II
THE COMPLAINANT INCURRED A PECUNIARY LOSS
IN EXCESS OF $1,000.
The elements required to be proven by the
State in a prosecution for theft by deception have been
advanced by this Court on numerous occasions.
"The necessary elements of
this offense are (l) a false or
fraudulent representation (2) made
knowing it to be such (3) with
intent to cheat or defraud the
person to whom the representation
was made; (4) an actual fraud must
have been perpetrated in the sense
that something of value was
obtained and the victim lost something of value, and (5) the
representation must have induced
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the owner to part with his property
in the sense that the owner parted
with his property in reliance upon
the truth of the representation."
State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244,
351 P.2d 96 at 97 (1960).
These elements are essentially the same as
this Court enumerated in the earlier cases of State v.
Howd, 55 Utah 527, 188 Pac. 628

(1920), and State v.

Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38 P.2d 1097 (1934).
In 0ddition to the above

ele~ents,

the Utah

court has requ1red that the victim sustain a "pecuniary
or property loss by reason of the transaction relied
upon."

Morris, supra, 38 P.2d at 1100.

But to this

requirement, the following caveat exists:
the actual fraud and
prejudice
. • is deter~ined
according to the situation of the
victim immediately after he parts
with his property.
If he gets what
was pretended and what he bargained
for, there is no fraud or prejudice."
38 P.2d at 1099.
See also State v. Fisher, 70 Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589 at
590 (1932).
Mr. Forshee asserts that since the complainant
received an automobile that he later came to like for a
price less than the fair market value of the car, he
has not sustained a pecuniary loss.

This argument

attempts to prove too much, and ignores entirely the
fact that the buyer would never have purchased the
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product had accurate representations been made.

In the

instant case, the complainant parted with $2,830 and
received in return a car that had more than twice as
many miles as the odometer indicated.
State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 Pac. 294
(1927), and Morris, supra, are readily distinguishable
from the case at bar.

In Casperson, supra, the Court

based its decision on the "innocent purchaser" theory,
and held that where the defendant was allowed to retain
title on cars financed by an independent party, that
his subsequent representation that he held title was
valid, and that the third

party received what it intended,

i.e., an obligation for payments on an auto whose title
was held by the defendant.

In Morris, supra, the Court

concluded that the finance company received what it
bargained for, a right to receive payments based on a
sales contract.

It stated that, "in all probability

it [the complaining corporation) did not and will not
sustain any loss."
One issue presented by this appeal is how is
the victim's loss to be determined.

The respondent has

been unable to find any Utah cases that address this
specific point.

However, two recent California decisions
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do discuss these issues.

In People v. Hess, 10 Cal.A.3d

1071, 90 Cal.R. 268 (1970), the victim purchased a horse
he was led to believe was Ingaia, a full-blooded Arabian
mare worth over $3,000.

The victim had agreed to pay

$1,000 for the animal, and at the time of trial he had
actually paid $550.

The horse purchased was shown to be

worth only about $150 to $200.

The court stated:

"If the representation
was knowingly made, the theft
was of $550 and constituted
grand theft.
If the representation was innocently made, no
crime at all was committed.
Under no circumstance were
appellants entitled to offset
the value of the spurious animal
used to accomplish the fraud
against the sum obtained from
the victims to reduce the crime
to petty theft."
90 Cal.R. at
273.
In People v. Ross, supra, the court addressed the
same issue, and said:

"As to the matter of the degree of

the theft, the defendant erroneously argues that the test is
ultimate loss rather than the amount of money received by
the accused."

100 Cal.R. at 706.

The Ross case is similar

to the instant case in that the defendant was convicted
for turning back odometers and subsequently selling them.
Hess and Ross are valuable precedent for at least
two reasons.

First of all, the California statute dealing

with theft by deception requires the sam 0 elements of proof
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as Section 76-6-405.
Codes, Volume 49,
80 Cal.R. 418

§

See West's Annotated California
484, note 393; and People v. Brady,

(1969).

Secondly, these decisions appear

to be the only cases that specifically address the issue
presented here.
The appellant argues that a decision by this
Court that follows the Ross rationale would necessitate
overruling Casperson, supra, and Morris, supra.

This is

not the case, since neither Casperson nor Morris address
the issue presented here.

Indeed, the Court's statement

in Casperson that it is the situation of the victim
immediately after he parts with his property that is
determinative, is supportive of the theory advanced in
both Ross and Hess.
In his conclusion, the appellant makes a further
attempt to point out reasons that this court should reject
Hess and Ross.

The appellant asserts at page 18 of his

brief that the California cases would not have resulted
in a conviction if the defendant had remained silent about
the altered odometers.
support this conclusion.

There is nothing in either case to
In any event, Section 76-6-401(5),

clearly precludes this result in Utah:
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"(5)
'Deception' occurs
when a person intentionally:
(a)
Creates or confirms by
words or conduct an impression
of law or fact that is false and
that the actor does not believe
to be true and that is likely to
affect the judgment of another in
the transaction; or
{b)
Fails to correct a false
impression of law or fact that the
actor previously created or confirmed
by words or conduct that is likely to
affect the judgment of another and
that the actor does not now believe
to be true • . • • "
In addition, this Court has held that "fraud by silence,
when circumstances require honest disclosure, may constitue
grounds for prosecution as well as false statements."
Ballaine v. District Court,l07 Utah 247, 153 P.2d 265 at
268

(1944).
The State submits that the best measure of the

theft is the full amount paid by the complainants for the
car.

This is the amount of money that the defendant

"obtained or exercise[d] control over • . • by deception."
Section 76-6-405.

It is also an amount that reflects the

loss of the complainant "immediately after he part[ed]
with his property."

Morris, supra.

Even though the car

was of some value, the fact remains that the complainants
would never have purchased the car from the defendant had
they known the true mileage on the odometer.
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POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-6-405 (SUPP. 1977) HAS

NOT BEEN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED IN THIS CASE.
In point three of his brief, pages 12 through
15, the appellant raises the general argument that
since odometer spinning has been going on for years,
and few if any violators have been prosecuted under the
terms of Section 76-6-405(1), that the a9pellant, while
realizing his conduct to be illegal, did not realize that
the punishment might be so severe.

In advancing his

argument, the appellant recognizes Section 76-1-106, but
nevertheless calls for a strict interpretation of Section
76-6-405{1).

The appellant does not contend that the

statute is vague on its face, but that it is vague as
applied.
It is without question that a statute must
inform people of ordinary intelligence who desire to obey
the law what conduct is not condoned.

State v. Shondel,

22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969); State v. Bateman,
113 Ariz. 10 7, 54 7 P. 2d 6 ( 19 7 6) •
"Void for vagueness simply
means that criminal responsibility
should not attach where one could not
reasonably understand that his
contemplated conduct is proscribed.
In determining the sufficiency of
the notice a statute must of necessity
be examined in the light of the conduct
with which a defendant is charged."
Sponsored by the S.J. QuinneyUnited
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided by the Dairy
Institute of Museum
and Library Services
States
v. National
Products
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
corp.,Machine-generated
372 u.s.OCR,29,
83
s.ct.
594
at
598
may contain errors.
(1963).

On the other hand, a

cri~inal

statute need not

meet impossible standards of specificity, Woofter v.
O'Donnell, 542 P.2d 1396 (Nevada 1975); nor does it need
to specifically list every act or omission which might
fall within its context, State v. Jones, 9 Wash.App. 1,
511 P.2d 74, 76 (1973); United States v. Harriss, 347
u.s. 612, 618, 74 s.ct. 808 (1954).
The appellant would like us to believe somehow
that by selling a used car with a turned back odometer and
obtaining $2,830 of the victim•s property, which he would
never have received had the victim known the true mileage,
that the seriousness of the offense is offset by the fact
that he could have sold the car elsewhere or by the fact
that the victim got something for his money.

The appellant

overlooks entirely the fact that the trial court found an
intent to defraud and that an actual fraud was committed
(R.llO), and furthermore, that the appellant would never
have obtained the victim's money had he not misrepresented
the mileage (R.lll).

An extension of the appellant's

theory would argue that if a thief and the stolen property
are both recaptured, that no crime has been committed since
the owner has suffered no loss.
It is safe to assume that the appellant was
aware that his conduct was illegal.

He should not be
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permitted to attack the constitutionality of his
conviction, merely because he underestimated the
severity of the potential punishment.

As was dis-

cussed previously in Point I of this brief, there is
no reason to believe that the legislature in enacting
the odometer statute desired to make it the only means
of charging violators.

Indeed, it deals only with the

act of spinning the odometer, and not the subsequent
sale.
The appellant's conduct fits specifically
into the realm of that proscriben by Utah Code Ann.
76-6-405(1)

§

(Supp. 1977), and the mere fact that he

failed to consider the full implications of his conduct does not
make this statute, as applied, constitutionally vague.
CONCLUSION
This is a case of first impression in Utah.
However, other jurisdictions that have considered this
approach to the odometer spinning problem have addressed
the issues presented by this appeal and sustained the
convictions.

The odometer statutes, Sections 41-6-176,

et seq., and the theft by deception statute, Section
76-6-405, are not duplicative.

A conviction under

Section 76-6-405 requires the State to meet additional
burdens of proof, i.e., a sale of the car and a pecuniary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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loss to the victim.

Since the statutes are not duplicative,

the rule of statutory interpretation advanced by the
appellant is inapplicable.
The victim in this case suffered a real pecuniary
loss.

Although he received a car that he later came to

like, he did not receive what was pretended or bargained
for.

As a result, the appellant gained control over the

victim's money solely on the basis of the deception he
exercised on him.

The victim would never have purchased

the car had he known its true mileage.
Section 76-6-405 has not been applied in an
unconstitutional manner.
spinning

was illegal.

The appellant knew that odometer
His error was that he

the potential severity of the crime.

underestimat~

The statute need only

inform people of ordinary intelligence, who desire to obey
the law, what conduct is not condoned.

The appellant's

conduct does not indicate a desire to obey the law.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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